Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy – CEDO: Luarea Copiilor Din Familie Este Justificată Doar De Existența Unui Pericol Imediat ( Nu Viitor )

Vezi si – Valeriu Ghilețchi ales în funcția de președinte al Comisiei Permanente pentru alegerea judecătorilor Curții Europene a Drepturilor Omului

CITESTE raportul integral de la CEDO aici – In the case of Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy

LIMBA ROMÂNĂ:

Multumim pentru sinteza in limba romana fratelui Tinu Cati:

Din motivațiile Curții Europene a Drepturilor Omului aduse în diferite procese în care trebuia să se decidă oportunitatea separării copiilor de familiile din care proveneau:
-luarea copiilor din familie este justificată doar de existența unui pericol imediat ( nu viitor ) pentru ei și este o măsură extremă, la care se apelează doar în ultimă instanță.
-dreptul părinților de a relaționa cu copiii lor este un element fundamental al VIEȚII DE FAMILIE.
-din respect pentru VIAȚA DE FAMILIE, Statul are obligația de a proteja legăturile ce s-au stabilit între membrii acesteia și de a contribui la dezvoltarea lor.
-Statul trebuie să păstreze un echilibru între interesul suprem al copilului și interesul părintelui. În cazul în care, din motive bine întemeiate, un copil a fost luat din familie, statul trebuie să țină cont de dreptul părinților de a păstra contactul cu copilul lor.
-Curtea reamintește că autoritățile trebuie să fie corecte și echilibrate atunci e vorba de interesul copilului și interesul părinților lui, și să nu comită abuzuri.
-părinții au dreptul de a-și proteja interesele lor ca părinți în fața justiției. Altminteri, justiția eșuează în a acorda respectul cuvenit VIEȚII DE FAMILIE.
-”Spargerea” unei familii, prin separarea copiilor de părinți, chiar și din motive întemeiate, este un lucru deosebit de serios, și se poate face numai după cântărirea cu grijă a tuturor consecințelor.
-în cazul în care a fost absolut necesară luarea copilului din cadrul familial, autoritățile trebuie să aibă grijă, din respect pentru VIAȚA DE FAMILIE, să nu limiteze drepturile legale ale părinților de a avea contact periodic cu acel copil.
-interesul primordial al copilului cere, pe de o parte, ca acesta să beneficieze, la modul general vorbind, de un mediu propice pentru de dezvoltarea sa fizică și emoțională; pe de altă parte, același interes cere ca legăturile cu familia să se păstreze, și copilul să nu fie rupt de rădăcinile lui. Prin urmare, ruperea completă a copilului de familia sa se poate face doar în situații absolut excepționale. Trebuie făcut totul pentru acea familie cu probleme să își revină și relațiile copii – părinți să se normalizeze.
-Curtea Europeană a Drepturilor Omului subliniază încă o dată că prelungirea timpului pe care membrii unei familii îl petrec separați unii de alții are consecințe grave asupra relațiilor familiale. Ruperea contactului dintre un copil de vârstă foarte fragedă și părinții lui are drept consecință deteriorarea progresivă a relațiilor copil- părinți și prin urmare a VIEȚII DE FAMILIE.

ENGLISH

European Court of Human Rights has ruled that the removal of children is only justified to protect from immediate danger, not risk of future harm

Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy
ECHR ruled that removal of children only justified to protect from immediate danger (not risk of future harm).

The removal of a child from the family setting is an extreme measure which should only be resorted to as a very last resort. Such a measure can only be justified if it corresponds to the aim of protecting a child who is faced with immediate danger
(see Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, § 148, ECHR 2000 VIII; Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, § 136, ECHR 2010; Y.C. v. the United Kingdom, no. 4547/10, §§ 133-138, 13 March 2012; and Pontes v. Portugal, no. 19554/09, §§ 74-80, 10 April 2012). The threshold set in the case-law is very high, and the Court considers it useful to refer to the following passages from the above-cited Pontes judgment:
“§ 74. The Court reiterates that the enjoyment by parent and child of each other’s company constitutes a fundamental element of family life (see Kutzner, cited above, § 58) and that domestic measures which hinder such enjoyment amount to an interference with the right protected by Article 8 of the Convention (see K. and T. v. Finland [GC], no. 25702/94, § 151, ECHR 2001-VII). Such interference violates Article 8, unless it is ‘in accordance with the law’, pursues one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in paragraph 2, and is ‘necessary in a democratic society’ to achieve the aim or aims concerned. The notion of ‘necessity’ implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see Couillard Maugery v. France, no. 64796/01, § 237, 1 July 2004).
§ 75. Although the essential object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, there may in addition be positive obligations inherent in an effective ‘respect’ for family life. Thus, where a family tie was established, the State must in principle act in such a way as to allow the relationship to develop and take any measures that might be appropriate to reunite the parent and child concerned (see, for example, Eriksson v. Sweden, 22 June 1989, § 71, Series A no. 156; Olsson v. Sweden (no. 2), 27 November 1992, § 90, Series A no. 250; Ignaccolo-Zenide v. Romania, no. 31679/96, § 94, ECHR 2000-I; Gnahoré v. France, no. 40031/98, § 51, ECHR 2000-IX, and, most recently, Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, § 140, ECHR 2010). The boundaries between the State’s positive and negative obligations under the Convention do not lend themselves to precise definition; the applicable principles are nonetheless similar. In particular, in both instances regard must be had to the fair balance which has to be struck between the competing interests – those of the child, of the two parents, and of public order – (see Maumousseau and Washington v. France, no. 93388/05, § 62, ECHR 2007 XIII), bearing in mind, however, that the child’s best interests must be the primary consideration (see to this effect Gnahoré, cited above, § 59, ECHR 2000-IX), and may, depending on their nature and seriousness, override those of the parents (see Sahin v. Germany [GC], no. 30943/96, § 66, ECHR 2003-VIII). The parents’ interests, especially in having regular contact with their child, nevertheless remain a factor when balancing the various interests at stake (see Haase v. Germany, no. 11057/02, § 89, ECHR 2004-III (extracts), or Kutzner v. Germany, cited above, § 58). In both contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation (see, for example, W., B. and R. v. the United Kingdom, 8 July 1987, Series A no. 121, §§ 60 and 61, and Gnahoré, cited above, § 52). The Court’s task is not to substitute itself for the domestic authorities in the exercise of their responsibilities for the regulation of the public care of children and the rights of parents whose children have been taken into care, but rather to review under the Convention the decisions that those authorities have taken in the exercise of their power of appreciation (see Hokkanen v. Finland, 23 September 1994, § 55, Series A no. 299 A).
§ 76. The Court reiterates that, while Article 8 contains no explicit procedural requirements, the decision-making process involved in measures of interference must be fair and must ensure due respect for the interests safeguarded by that Article. It must therefore be determined whether, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and notably the serious nature of the decisions to be taken, the parents were able to play a part in the decision-making process, seen as a whole, to a sufficient degree to provide them with the requisite protection of their interests. If not, there will have been a failure to respect their family life and the interference resulting from the decision will not be capable of being regarded as ‘necessary’ within the meaning of Article 8 (see W. v. the United Kingdom, 8 July 1987, § 64, Series A no. 121).
§ 77. In order to determine whether the impugned measures were ‘necessary in a democratic society’ the Court has to consider whether, in the light of the case as a whole, the reasons adduced to justify them were relevant and sufficient for the purposes of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. In so doing, it takes into consideration the fact that it is an interference of a very serious order to split up a family; such a step must be supported by sufficiently sound and weighty considerations in the interests of the child (see Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, § 148, ECHR 2000-VIII).
§ 78. While the authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in assessing the necessity of taking a child into care, a stricter scrutiny is nonetheless called for in respect of any further limitations, such as restrictions placed by those authorities on parental rights of access, and of any legal safeguards designed to secure an effective protection of the right of parents and children to respect for their family life. Such further limitations entail the danger that the family relations between the parents and a young child would be curtailed (see Gnahoré, cited above, § 54, and Sahin v. Germany [GC], no. 30943/96, § 65, ECHR 2003-VIII).
§ 79. On the one hand, the interest clearly entails ensuring that the child develops in a sound environment and that under no circumstances can a parent be entitled under Article 8 to have measures taken that would harm the child’s health and development (see Sahin, cited above, § 66). On the other hand, it is clear that it is equally in the child’s interest for its ties with its family to be maintained, except in cases where the family has proved particularly unfit, since severing those ties means cutting a child off from its roots. It follows that the interest of the child dictates that family ties may only be severed in very exceptional circumstances and that everything must be done to preserve personal relations and, if and when appropriate, to ‘rebuild’ the family (see Gnahoré, cited above, § 59).
§ 80. Furthermore, the Court reiterates that, in cases concerning family life, the passage of time can have irremediable consequences for relations between the child and the parent with whom he or she does not live. The breaking-off of contact with a very young child may result in the progressive deterioration of the child’s relationship with his or her parent (see Ignaccolo-Zenide v. Romania, cited above, § 102, and Maire v. Portugal, no. 48206/99, § 74, ECHR 2003-VI).”

https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng…

Jonathan Ritchie 

Un comentariu (+add yours?)

  1. octavpelin
    ian. 26, 2018 @ 03:33:15

    A republicat asta pe Octavpelin's Weblog.

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