Does Science Show That Miracles Can’t Happen? Alvin Plantinga

Speaker: Alvin Plantinga – The Heidelberg Catechism: „Providence is the almighty and ever present power of God by which he upholds, as with his hand, heaven and earth and all creatures, and so rules them that leaf and blade, rain and drought, fruitful and lean years, food and drink, health and sickness, prosperity and poverty–all things, in fact, come to us not by chance but from his fatherly hand.”

Classical Christian idea here: Regularity, dependability; but also special action. Miracles in scripture: the parting of the Red Sea, Jesus’s walking on water and changing water into wine, miraculous healings, rising from the dead. But not just in Bible times: according to classical Christians, also now responds to prayers; healings; works in the hearts and minds of his children (internal testimony of the Holy Spirit; sanctification). God constantly causes events in the world. (photo via www.veritas-ucsb.org)

Alvin Carl Plantinga is an American analytic philosopher, the John A. O’Brien Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at the University of Notre Dame and the inaugural holder of the Jellema Chair in Philosophy at Calvin College.

Born: November 15, 1932 (age 80), Ann Arbor

Education: Yale University, Jamestown College, Harvard University,University of Michigan, Calvin College

An Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism – Alvin Plantinga at USC

PlantingaSome points/notes from the Plantinga lecture, in which he argues that naturalism and evolution do not fit together:

–Plantinga defines naturalism (3:45) as the belief that there is no such person as God, or anything like God, Naturalism is stronger than atheism.  Naturalism entails atheism, but atheism doesn’t entail naturalism. You can be an atheist without rising to the heights of, or sinking to the depths of naturalism. For example, someone like Hegel, who thought there was this giant absolute that includes all the realities, but didn’t think there was an omnipotent, omniscient, holy, good person. Such a person would be an atheist, but would not be a naturalist. Naturalism, as I say is stronger than atheism.  Naturalism and evolution are usually thought of as bosom buddies, supporting each other. Evolution is always thought of as kind of a pillar in the temple of naturalism. I would argue that one can’t be a naturalist and also accept evolution, as evolution is ordinarily thought of. They conflict with each other. They go against each other. The conjunction of the two is self referentially incoherent. Christians should not only argue against naturalism, and only assert that naturalism is false, but Christians ought to provide arguments here. We’re enjoined in the New Testament to always be ready with a ‘reason for the hope that is within us’. So, I think the Christian community- Christian students and the like, should be willing to give arguments of this sort.

According to theism, we human beings have been created by a holy, good, all powerful, all knowing being, namely God, who has made us in His own image (made us like Him), and has aims and intentions- He intends certain things, aims that certain should happen, and aims that certain things should happen, and can act in such a way to accomplish those aims. That’s part of what it means to be a person. So there is God, on the one hand, in the theistic story, who has created the world, and on the other hand is creation, that which is created. You might think of naturalism as the theistic world picture minus God. Among famous, well known naturalists there would be the late Carl Sagan, with his portentous incantation ‘the cosmos is all there is or ever has been, or ever will be’, also the late Steven Jay Gould, David Armstrong, the philosopher, the later Darwin, John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, John Lucas, a former philosopher at Oxford, who says that ‘naturalism is the contemporary orthodoxy  of the academy’. Naturalism is certainly strong in the academy, certainly among philosophers

My argument will have to do with cognitive faculties, memory, perception, the faculty by which one forms beliefs, the faculty whereby one knows things, memory, perception, insight, where you learn mathematical truths and logical truths, maybe reads sympathies- whereby you know what other people are thinking and feeling, induction- where you can learn by experience. So these would be cognitive faculties.

The structure of the argument

In brief, here’s how my argument will go. I’ll argue: If naturalism and evolution, if that pair of propositions, if they were both true, than it would be improbable that our cognitive faculties (memory and so on) are in fact reliable. That they give us, for the most part, true beliefs. Once you see that, then if you accept naturalism and evolution you have a defeater for this proposition  that ‘your cognitive faculties are reliable’, a reason to give that belief up, a reason to to believe it. Once you have a defeater for that proposition for that ‘that your cognitive faculties are reliable’, then you have a defeater for any proposition that you take to be produced by your cognitive faculties. Naturally, that’s all of them. I mean, where else would they come from. So, then you have a defeater for also for naturalism and evolution itself. So, you might say it’s self defeating. It’s self referentially inconsistent. (11:00)

YOU CAND READ more of these notes from here- http://www.qcc.cuny.edu/socialsciences

Video Published on Feb 23, 2013 http://www.veritas.org/talks – Alvin Plantinga is known for his work in philosophy of religion, epistemology, metaphysics, and Christian apologetics. Notably, he has argued that some can know that God exists as a basic belief in the same way that people usually claim to know that other minds exist. VeritasForum·

Related posts

Divine Action in the World (i.e. miracles) Alvin Plantinga Lecture, May 12, 2011 at Western Washington University

the Stainned Gless of depicting the Holy Spirit.

Image via Wikipedia

(VIA)  PDF format link here.

The Heidelberg Catechism: „Providence is the almighty and ever present power of God by which he upholds, as with his hand, heaven and earth and all creatures, and so rules them that leaf and blade, rain and drought, fruitful and lean years, food and drink, health and sickness, prosperity and poverty–all things, in fact, come to us not by chance but from his fatherly hand.”

Classical Christian idea here: Regularity, dependability; but also special action. Miracles in scripture: the parting of the Red Sea, Jesus’s walking on water and changing water into wine, miraculous healings, rising from the dead. But not just in Bible times: according to classical Christians, also now responds to prayers; healings; works in the hearts and minds of his children (internal testimony of the Holy Spirit; sanctification). God constantly causes events in the world.

I. What’s the Problem?

Many theologians think there is a science/religion problem here.

Rudolf Bultmann:

The historical method includes the presupposition that history is a unity in the sense of a closed continuum of effects in which individual events are connected by the succession of cause and effect. [This continuum, furthermore,] cannot be rent by the interference of supernatural, transcendent powers. (Existence and Faith)

Jolm Macquarrie agrees:

The way of understanding miracle that appeals to breaks in the natural order and to supernatural interventions belongs to the mythological outlook and cannot commend itself in a post-mythological climate of thought. … The traditional conception of miracle is irreconcilable with our modem understanding of both science and history. Science proceeds on the assumption that whatever events occur in the world can be accounted for in terms of other events that also belong within the world; and if on some occasions we are unable to give a complete account of some happening … the scientific conviction is that further research will bring to light further factors in the situation, but factors that will turn out to be just as immanent and this-worldly as those already known. (Principles of Christian Theology)

So does Langdon Gilkey:

… contemporary theology does not expect, nor does it speak of, wondrous divine events on the surface of natural and historical life. The causal nexus in space and time which the enlightenment science and philosophy introduced into the Western mind … is also assumed by modem theologians and scholars; since they participate in the modem world of science both intellectually and existentially, they can scarcely do anything else. Now this assumption of a causal order among phenomenal events, and therefore of the authority of the scientific interpretation of observable events, makes a great difference to the validity one assigns to biblical narratives and so to the way one understands their meaning. Suddenly a vast panoply of divine deeds and events recorded in scripture are no longer regarded as having actually happened… Whatever the Hebrews believed, we believe that the biblical people lived in the same causal continuum of space and time in 2 which we live, and so one in which no divine wonders transpired and no divine voices were heard. „Cosmology, Ontology and the Travail of Biblical Language”

So what exactly is the problem?

According to the classical Christian and theistic picture of the world, God is a person, one who has knowledge, loves and hates, and aims or ends; he acts on the basis of his knowledge to achieve his ends. Second, God is all-powerful, all-knowing and wholly good. God has these properties essentially, and indeed necessarily: he has them in every possible world in which he exists, and he exists in every possible world. (Thus God is a necessarily existent concrete being, and the only necessarily existent concrete being.) Third, God has created the world. Fourth, as noted above by the Heidelberg Catechism, God conserves, sustains, maintains in being this world he has created. Fifth, at least sometimes God acts in a way going beyond creation and conservation (e.g., miracles, but also providential guiding of history, working in the hearts of people, etc.)

The problem: God’s special action in the world: action beyond conservation and creation (C&C).

Miracle would be an example. ‘Hands-off Theology’ (Bultmann: „interfering”)

Why is this a problem? Their suggestion: Contrary, somehow, to science.

Gilkey: modern theologians and scholars participate in the world of science….Not just theologians: also philosophers.

Philip Clayton:

Science has created a challenge to theology by its remarkable ability to explain and predict natural phenomena. Any theological system that ignores the picture of the world painted by scientific results is certain to be regarded with suspicion.

He goes on:

But science is often identified with determinism. In a purely deterministic universe there would be no room for God to work in the world except through the sort of miraculous intervention that Hume–and many of his readers–found to be so insupportable. Thus many, both inside and outside of theology, have abandoned any doctrine of divine action as incompatible with the natural sciences. (Anti-interventionism)

Also many scientists. Dawkins, Atkins, et. aI, but also, e.g., H. Allen Orr:

It is not that some sects of one religion invoke miracles but that many sects of many religions do. (Moses, after all, parted the waters and Krishna healed the sick.) I agree of course that no sensible scientists can tolerate such exceptionalism with respect to the laws of nature. (New York Review of Books May 13, 2004).

So the real problem here: science promulgates natural laws; if God did miracles or acted specially in the world, he would have to contravene these laws and miraculously intervene; and that’s contrary to science.

3 Bultmann:

someone who avails herself of modern medicine and uses the wireless (not to mention, I suppose, television, computers, and digital cameras) can’t also believe in the spirit and wonder world of the New Testament.

But is all this really true?

II. The Old Picture

Bultmann, et. al. apparently thinking in terms of classical science (Newtonian mechanics, the later physics of electricity and magnetism represented by Maxwell’s Equations). „God said, ‘Let Newton be, …'”

Newtonian World Picture: God has created the world, which is like an enormous machine proceeding according to fixed laws: the laws of classical physics. But this not sufficient for Anti-interventionism or Hands-off Theology; Newton himself (one thinks) accepted the Newtonian World Picture, but didn’t accept hands-off theology. Newton’s laws describe how the world works provided that the world is a closed (isolated) system, subject to no outside causal influence. (The partial derivative with respect to time of the LaGrangian of the system is zero).

The great conservation laws deduced from Newton’s Laws are stated for closed or isolated systems. Sears and Zemanski’s University Physics: „. . . this is the principle of conservation of linear momentum: When no resultant external force acts on a system, the total momentum of the system remains constant in magnitude and direction.” And the principle of conservation of energy states that „the internal energy of an isolated system remains constant. This is the most general statement of the principle of conservation of energy”.

So these principles apply to isolated or closed systems. Nothing, here, to prevent God from changing the velocity or direction of a particle, or from creating ex nihilo a fullgrown horse. Energy is conserved in a closed system; but it is no part of Newtonian mechanics or classical science generally to declare that the material universe is indeed a closed system. (How could a thing like that be experimentally verified?)

To get hands-off theology, we need more than classical science as such; Determinism. Common definition: the natural laws plus state of the universe at any time entails the state of the universe at any other time.

Pierre LaPlace:

We ought then to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its previous state and as the cause of the one which is to follow. Given for one instant a mind which could comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated and the respective situation of the beings that compose it–a mind sufficiently vast to subject these data to analysis–it would embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the past, would be present to its eyes.

4 The idea: the material universe is a system of particles such that whatever happens at any time, together with the laws, determines whatever happens at any other time; i.e. the state of the U at any time t together with the laws entails the state of the U at any other time t*. Determinism.

This picture is supposed to preclude SDA, and also human freedom.

But this picture is accurate only if the universe is causally closed: only if God doesn’t act specially in the world. If he did, that great mind would not be able to make its calculations.

LaPlacian picture: the Newtonian picture plus closure. This is the picture guiding the thought of Bultmann, Macquarrie, Gilkey, et.a!. (Interesting irony: in the name of being scientific and up to date they urge on us a picture of the world that is scientifically out of date by many decades.)

But classical science doesn’t assert or include closure (or determinism). The laws describe how things go when the universe is causally closed, subject to no outside causal influence.

J.L. Mackie:

What we want to do here is to contrast the order of nature with a possible divine or supernatural intervention. The laws of nature, we must say, describe the ways in which the world–including, of course, human beings–works when left to itself, when not interfered with. A miracle occurs when the world is not left to itself, when something distinct from the natural order as a whole intrudes into it (The Miracle of Theism).

So the natural laws would take the form: (NL) When the universe is causally closed (God is not acting specially in the world), P. This seems a good description of the laws of nature and fits with the Newtonian picture. So thought of, the natural laws offer no threat to divine special action, including miracles.

The LaPlacian picture results only if we add that the universe is in fact a causally closed system and God never acts specially in it.

So there is in classical science no objection to special divine action (or to human free action, dualistically conceived). To get such an objection, we must add that the (material) universe is causally closed. That’s a metaphysical or theological add on, not part of classical science. Classical science perfectly consistent with special divine action including miracles (walking on water, rising from the dead, creating ex nihilo a full grown horse). No religion/science conflict here; only a religion/metaphysics conflict.

So why do those theologians reject miracles? Because they (mistakenly) think miracles are contrary to science.

But they have another objection: this, so they say, would involve God’s intervening in the world, and these theologians have objections to that (e.g., God would be establishing regularities with one hand, but undermining them with the other). But this is a theological objection, not drawn from science. Nothing in classical science conflicts with miracle or SDA.

III. The New Picture

Quantum mechanics: the LaPlacian (and Newtonian) picture is now superseded; in particular, the laws of qm are probabilistic rather than deterministic. Given a qm system, a system of particles, e.g., they don’t say which configuration will in fact result from the initial conditions, but instead assign probabilities to the possible outcomes. Miracles (walking on water, rising from the dead, etc.) clearly not incompatible with these laws. (No doubt very improbable; but we already knew that.)

Further, on collapse interpretations, e.g., the original Copenhagen interpretation and the collapse theories of Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber, God could be the cause of the collapses, and of the way in which they occur. And on hidden variable interpretations, the laws describe how things go when God isn’t acting specially.

And if higher level laws supervene on (are determined by) lower level laws, nothing compatible with lower level laws will be incompatible with higher level laws. But very many philosophers, theologians and scientists who are wholly aware of the qm revolution still apparently find a problem with miracles and special divine action generally.

For example, „The Divine Action Project” (so-called by Wesley Wildman (Theology and Science 2, p. 31ff.)), a IS-year series of conferences and publications that began in 1988. So far these conferences have resulted in 5 or 6 books of essays involving some 50 or more authors from various fields of science together with philosophers and theologians, including many of the most prominent writers in the field: John Polkinghome, Arthur Peacocke, Nancey Murphy, Philip Clayton, many others. Certainly a serious and most impressive attempt to come to grips with the topic of divine action in the world. Nearly all of these authors believe that a satisfactory account of God’s action in the world would have to be noninterventionistic.

According to Wesley Wildman in his account of the Divine.Action Project: „… The DAP project tried to be sensitive to issues of theological consistency. For example, the idea of God sustaining nature and its law-like regularities with one hand while miraculously intervening, abrogating or ignoring those regularities with the other hand struck most members as dangerously close to outright contradiction. Most participants certainly felt that God would not create an orderly world in which it was impossible for the creator to act without violating the created structures of order.”

Philip Clayton: the real problem here, apparently, is that it is very difficult to come up with an idea of divine action in the world in which such action would not constitute „breaking natural law” or „breaking physical law.”

Arthur Peacocke comments as follows on a certain proposal for divine action, a proposal according to which God’s special actions would be undetectable: God would have to be conceived of as actually manipulating micro-events (at the atomic, molecular, and according to some, quantum levels) in these initiating fluctuations on the natural world in order to produce the results at the macroscopic level which God wills. But such a conception of God’s action … would then be no different in principle from that of God intervening in the order of nature with all the problems that that evokes for a rationally coherent belief in God as the creator of that order.

But what, exactly, is the problem with intervention? More poignantly, what is intervention?

Can say what it is on the old picture. The form of law: (NL) When the universe is causally closed (when God is not acting specially in the world), P.

So consider the result of deleting the antecedents from the laws and call the conjunction of the P’s ‘L’. There is an intervention when an event E occurs such that there is an earlier state of the universe S such that S&L does not entail E.But nothing like this available on the New Picture. So what would an intervention be?

(1) God does something A that causes a state of affairs that would not have occurred if God had not done A.

But then any act of conservation would be an intervention; and presumably no one’s worried about conservation.

(2) God performs an act A which is neither conservation nor creation that causes a state of affairs that would not have occurred if he had not performed A.

But isn’t this just (substantially) acting specially in the world? The alleged objection to SDA: it involves intervention. What is intervention? SDA. So the problem with SDA is SDA.

(3) God performs an act that is very improbable, given the previous states of the world.

But what’s the problem with that? Why shouldn’t God perform very improbable acts?

(4) There are various lower level generalizations not entailed by qm on which we rely: bread nourishes, people don’t walk on water or rise from the dead, etc. God intervenes when he causes an event contrary to one of those generalizations.

But again, what’s the problem with that? Are we to suppose these lower level regularities are like the laws of the Medes and Persians, so that once God has established one of them, not even he can act contrary to it? In any event this kind of objection is philosophical or theological, not scientific. There is nothing in science, under either the old or the new picture, that conflicts with or even „calls into question” SDA, including miracles.

From Ravi Zacharias – 2 short lectures, Alvin Plantinga.1)Does God have a nature and 2)What is a properly Basic Belief?

Ravi Zacharias presents these 2 short videos (approx 20 minutes each) through his ministry RFZIM: Alvin Plantinga is John A. O’Brien Professor of Philosophy University of Notre Dame and author of (among other books) ‘Warranted Christian Belief’.

Does God have a nature?

What is a properly Basic Belief?

Reasons for God – Alvin Plantinga

Alvin Carl Plantinga (born November 15, 1932) is an American analytic philosopher, formerly the John A. O’Brien Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. He is known for his work in philosophy of religion, epistemology, metaphysics, and Christian apologetics. Plantinga is a Christian and known for applying the methods of analytic philosophy to defend orthodox Christian beliefs.

Plantinga is the author of a number of books, including God and Other Minds (1967), The Nature of Necessity (1974), and the „warrant” series culminating in Warranted Christian Belief (2000). He has delivered the Gifford Lectures three times, and was described by Time magazine in 1980 as „America’s leading orthodox Protestant philosopher of God.”[1]

Philosophical views

Notably, Plantiga has argued that some people can know that God exists as a basic belief, requiring no argument, similar to how people usually claim to know that other minds exist. He has also argued that there is no logical inconsistency between the existence of evil and the existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, wholly good God.[25]

Problem of evil

Main article: Plantinga’s free will defense

In The Nature of Necessity, Plantinga presents his free will defense to the logical problem of evil. Plantinga’s aim is to show that the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, wholly good God is not inconsistent with the existence of evil, as many philosophers have argued.

In a truncated form, Plantinga’s argument is as follows: He argues that it is greater for a being to possess free will, as opposed to being non-free. And because a God cannot guarantee the benevolence of a truly free being without intervention or influence, thus removing free will, it follows that for a being to have true free will that they must be capable of moral evil else such a being would be only capable of moral good, which in itself is as Plantinga stated: „Entirely paradoxical”. Plantinga goes on to argue that a world with free will is more valuable then a world without such, therefore God has reason to create a world which has the capability of evil. Thus because of this the existence of evil counts „neither against God’s omnipotence nor against His goodness„, rather it is an error by the creature in their exercise of such freedom.[26]

According to Chad Meister, professor of philosophy at Bethel College, most contemporary philosophers accept Plantinga’s argument.[27] The problem of evil is now commonly framed in evidential form which does not involve the claim that God and evil are logically contradictory or inconsistent. However, some philosophers continue to defend the cogency of the logical problem of evil.[30]

Reformed epistemology

Plantinga’s contributions to epistemology include an argument which he dubs „Reformed epistemology„. According to Reformed epistemology, belief in God can be rational and justified even without arguments or evidence for the existence of God. More specifically, Plantinga argues that belief in God is properly basic, and due to a religious externalist epistemology, he claims belief in God could be justified independently of evidence. His externalist epistemology, called „Proper functionalism,” is a form of epistemological reliabilism.

Plantinga discusses his view of Reformed epistemology and Proper functionalism in a three volume series. In the first book of the trilogy, Warrant: The Current Debate, Plantinga introduces, analyzes, and criticizes 20th century developments in analytic epistemology, particularly the works of Chisholm, BonJour, Alston, Goldman, and others.

In the second book, Warrant and Proper Function, he introduces the notion of warrant as an alternative to justification and discusses topics like self-knowledge, memories, perception, and probability. Plantinga’s proper function account argues that as a necessary condition of having warrant is that one’s „belief-forming and belief-maintaining apparatus of powers” are functioning properly—”working the way it ought to work”.[31] Plantinga explains his argument for proper function with reference to a „design plan”, as well as an environment in which one’s cognitive equipment is optimal for use. Plantinga asserts that the design plan does not require a designer: „it is perhaps possible that evolution (undirected by God or anyone else) has somehow furnished us with our design plans”,[32] but the paradigm case of a design plan is like a technological product designed by a human being (like a radio or a wheel).

Plantinga seeks to defend this view of proper function against alternative views of proper function proposed by other philosophers which he groups together as ‘naturalistic’ including the ‘functional generalization’ view of John Pollock, the evolutionary/etiological account provided by Ruth Millikan, and a dispositional view held by John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter.[33] Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism is also discussed in the later chapters of Warrant and Proper Function.

In 2000, the third volume, Warranted Christian Belief, was published. Plantinga reintroduces his theory of warrant to ask whether Christian theistic belief can enjoy warrant. He argues that this is plausible. Notably, the book does not address whether or not Christian theism is true.

Modal ontological argument

Plantinga has expressed a modal logic version of the ontological argument in which he uses modal logic to develop, in a more rigorous and formal way, Norman Malcolm‘s and Charles Hartshorne‘s modal ontological arguments.

Evolutionary argument against naturalism

In Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism, he argues that the truth of evolution is an epistemic defeater for naturalism (i.e. if evolution is true, it undermines naturalism). His basic argument is that if evolution and naturalism are both true, human cognitive faculties evolved to produce beliefs that have survival value (maximizing one’s success at the four F’s: „feeding, fleeing, fighting, and reproducing”), not necessarily to produce beliefs that are true. Thus, since human cognitive faculties are tuned to survival rather than truth in the naturalism-cum-evolution model, there is reason to doubt the veracity of the products of those same faculties, including naturalism and evolution themselves. On the other hand, if God created man „in his image” by way of an evolutionary process (or any other means), then Plantinga argues our faculties would probably be reliable.

The argument does not assume any necessary correlation (or uncorrelation) between true beliefs and survival. Making the contrary assumption—that there is in fact a relatively strong correlation between truth and survival—if human belief-forming apparatus evolved giving a survival advantage, then it ought to yield truth since true beliefs confer a survival advantage. Plantinga counters that, while there may be overlap between true beliefs and beliefs that contribute to survival, the two kinds of beliefs are not the same.

Position on evolution and Christianity

In the past, Plantinga has lent support to the intelligent design movement.[35] He was a member of the ‘Ad Hoc Origins Committee’ that supported Philip E. Johnson‘s book Darwin on Trial against palaeontologist Stephen Jay Gould‘s high profile scathing review in Scientific American in 1992.[36] Plantinga also provided a back-cover endorsement of Johnson’s book.[37] He was a Fellow of the (now moribund) pro-intelligent design International Society for Complexity, Information, and Design,[38] and has presented at a number of intelligent design conferences.[39] He is among the charter signatories of the 2008 published „Evangelical Manifesto”.[40]

In a March 2010 article in the Chronicle of Higher Education, philosopher of science Michael Ruse claims that Plantinga is an „open enthusiast of intelligent design.”[41] In a letter to the editor, Plantinga has the following response:

Like any Christian (and indeed any theist), I believe that the world has been created by God, and hence „intelligently designed.” The hallmark of intelligent design, however, is the claim that this can be shown scientifically; I’m dubious about that. …As far as I can see, God certainly could have used Darwinian processes to create the living world and direct it as he wanted to go; hence evolution as such does not imply that there is no direction in the history of life. What does have that implication is not evolutionary theory itself, but unguided evolution, the idea that neither God nor any other person has taken a hand in guiding, directing or orchestrating the course of evolution. But the scientific theory of evolution, sensibly enough, says nothing one way or the other about divine guidance. It doesn’t say that evolution is divinely guided; it also doesn’t say that it isn’t. Like almost any theist, I reject unguided evolution; but the contemporary scientific theory of evolution just as such—apart from philosophical or theological add-ons—doesn’t say that evolution is unguided. Like science in general, it makes no pronouncements on the existence or activity of God.[42]

(source)

Here is an excerpt from the video below, in which Professor Plantinga discusses evolution and naturalism:

What I say, is if you don’t believe in God and if you’re a naturalist and you also accept evolution, then you’ve got a reason to think that your faculties aren’t reliable. If you’re not like that,  like everybody, you just take it for granted that your faculties are reliable, that seems to me perfectly sensible.

Blogosfera Evanghelică

Vizite unicate din Martie 6,2011

free counters

Va multumim ca ne-ati vizitat azi!


România – LIVE webcams de la orase mari